A n ation's wealth is both an object of conquest to covetous aggressors and a resource to its owners for self d efen s e. To m aintain autonomy every country must mount a defense which either makes its capture (1) more ex p en s i v e t h an an y aggressor can afford, or (2) more expensive than it is worth to aggressors. Whether this condition can be satisfied for all countries simultaneously depends as shown in this paper on relative efficacy of m i l i t ar y offense versus defense, the aggregate of wealth among nations and its distribution, and the benefits a co n queror may obtain from conquest, including the duration of these benefits. The paper shows how these fact or s fi t t ogether to determine the sustainability and stability of the international distribution of property as embodied in the configuration of sovereign states.
(Examples include Alesina and Spolaore (1997 , 2000a , 2000b , Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg 2000), 1 Friedman (1977) , Garfinkel (1990) , Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) , Grossman (1998) Grossman and Mendoza (2001) , Hi r s h leifer (1988, 2000) , Konrad and Skaperdas (2001) , Neary (1997) , Sandler (2000) , Skaperdas (1992) , Wittman (1991 Wittman ( , 2000 , and many others. Some of this work just takes states as local public good jurisdictions and asks the optimal number, public good provision, and population composition. Other work ignores public good effects altogether and takes trade vs size as the sources of private economic benefit. Some combines this with scale economies in military power and/or conflict success functions originated in the rent seeking literature to examine the incentives to produce versus fight over distribution. Production technology, political transaction costs, and military coercion technology, are prominent in some explanations while the geography of state borders, and the administrative costs of tax collection are determinative factors in others. Still other variations include the style of governance, whether democratic or autocratic as influential.
Property Distributions and the Configuration of Sovereign States:
Wh y at any given time are there a particular number of sovereign countries? At the moment, we h av e ab o ut 200, the number having increased fairly rapidly since the end of the Cold War and resurrection of boundary issues virtually throughout the globe. On average over this period countries have grown much r i ch er , which means they present more lucrative objects of conquest than earlier. But simultaneously they h av e become more capable guardians of their own integrity. Also the dispersion of wealth among countries has increased.
How do these factors influence the processes whereby states merge or fragment and therefore ultimately t h ei r n u m b ers? This question of the economics of state formation has evoked a growing literature, not always necessarily couched in the language of (inter)national merger and fragmentation, not even always concerned with conflict, appropriation, and wealth or prosperity although this is the most common context. 1 An ear l y an d especially trenchant approach was suggested by economist Earl Thompson (1974 Thompson ( , 1979 .
In the first of his papers Thompson proposed:
[Wh en] the distribution of capital between countries is an equilibrium distribution...each... h as rationally decided...which property to claim and defend...and...the decisions are mutually consistent given the world's aggregate stocks of capital... In equilibrium, the country possessing a u n i t of capital in a given period is the country that has made a prior commitment to impose o n an y o ther country attempting to acquire the capital, damages which are at least as great as t h e value of the capital to that [aggressor] country. [Journal of Political Economy, 1974, In the second article Thompson repeated. "Each 'nation' or given subgroup of individuals, must defend 2 its assets in order to own them ... For any distribution of property between nations, there is a set of minimal national defense efforts required to prevent one nation from taking the property of another... When property is distributed so that rationally chosen defense efforts reach these levels, there is an equilibrium distribution of property across the various nations." [Journal of Political Economy, 1979 pp. 2-3.] .
The benefits labeled "strategic" are in truth economic benefits as well. The term "strategic" is simply 3 meant to distinguish benefits and costs connected with interactions between military forces which have traditionally been the purview of political and military strategists. Due to Tullock (1974) and Hirshleifer (1991) , economists have come to call the mathematical formulae that express these reciprocal relations "conflict success functions." p. 758].
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Th i s p ap er b u i lds a simple comparative static model to capture Thompson's idea (further elaborated in the second of his two articles) and illuminate how equilibrium depends on the aggregate magnitude and distribution o f p r o p er t y. In doing this we uncover an important part of the puzzle missing from Thompson. Specifically we i dent ify two primitive economic mechanisms which produce such security/equilibrium in the distribution o f property under international anarchy. I call these: "Security by Denial of Benefits from Conquest" and "Security by Making Conquest Unaffordable." They relate closely to military concerns about an enemy's intentions vs. capabilities, and to strategic concepts of deterrence and defense (McGuire 1967) , (Snyder 1961) , (Schelling 1960 (Schelling , 1967 , (Wohlstetter 1959) . This exposition, which I hope will capture a unifying thread t h r ough the literature mentioned, reflects a rational conflict approach to the sources of equilibrium in the international system. Irrational-extortionist and chicken-type commitment games as sources balance are left unexplored.
INCENTIVES FOR PROPERTY REALIGNMENTS
Al l o y ed i n Thompson's analysis and most others mentioned above are three material factors crucial to one nation's gain from merger or separation from another.
1.
S t rategic Advantage/Survival effects of merger or separation: When does merger/conquest improve count r i es ' military capabilities, offensive or defensive? Because of economies of scale and scope in d efen s e o r offense both countries in a merger may gain strategically. There may simply be technical 3 m i l itary advantages from merging as where interior borders need not be defended (Sandler, 1977; San d l er an d Hartley, 2001) . Or the advantages may be more conventionally economic, as where costs of defense are fixed, independent of size of population or wealth.
Th is first incentive derives from the reciprocal relation between economic size/strength and national power and survival. It depends crucially on how technology, geography, and scale influence the relative power of attack vs. defense. (Hirshleifer 1988 (Hirshleifer , 1989 , (Levy, 1984) , Read (1964) , (Skaperdas, 1992 (Skaperdas, , 1996 .
2.
Production, Investment, Consumption effects of merger of states: When do countries gain co m m er cially from a merger? Because of mutual gains in production or consumption stemming from economies of scope, of scale, or transaction costs (in provision of private goods and especially of p u b lic goods) some or all countries may benefit from aggregation. Merger may permit greater specialization of labor, investment and trade, and thus greater output or better allocation of risk than even that afforded by perfect free trade. (The related, inverse, question of when countries benefit from division will not be explicitly addressed.) Th i s second factor implies that increased production/consumption opportunities can lead nations to a recognition o f t h e higher opportunity costs of conflict and, therefore, to replacement of border/sovereignty battles by com petition and cooperation in production-investment-trade, (Anderton 1992 (Anderton , 2000a , (Garfinkel and Sk ap er d as, 2000), (Genicot and Skaperdas, 2002) (McGuire 1990) , (Polachek 1980) , (Seiglie 2001) , and (Sk ap er d as and Syropolous, 2002) . Thus some of the costs of aggression may show up not merely as resource costs of military action, but also as opportunity costs of trade or other amicable interactions among states which war/conquest precludes.
Property Right and Wealth Distribution effects of merger or separation:
When does one country g ain from conquest and exploitation of another? As we argue, because of a surplus of wealth over s u b s i s t en ce needs, a country may gain a redistributive transfer of this surplus by means of conquesttheft.
Th i s last factor elevates the modern concern for the allocative and distributive implications of property right as s i g n m en t to an international level. The idea is central to Thompson. See also Anderton (1999 ), Findlay (1996 , Hirshleifer (1988 Hirshleifer ( ,1991 , Grossman (1998 ), and Tullock ( 1974 .
Th ese three effects may be interdependent or nested. For example, the strategic gains from merger m ay arise because of the economic gains (e.g. if it is the economic enrichment caused by merger that makes s om e s or t s of military capability affordable). Or the possibilities for enrichment from redistributive conquest may only derive from economic efficiencies due to greater scale of the merged states.
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Todd Sandler reminds me of the potential for and desirability of incorporating three-plus country 4 contests and, therefore, alliances and clubs in the bare bones model presented herein. As the results derived later show, such analysis will yield such surprises as alliance formations among smaller states which generate instabilities in a larger arena.
Thi s paper will combine these three effects in a simple comparative static analysis (see Garfinkel 1990 for dynam ic analysis going beyond Thompson's) to show how benefit and cost calculations support a country's i n d ep en dence, or failing that, its conquest or capitulation. Such benefit-cost calculations in turn provide the foundat i on for equilibria in the numbers, sizes, and compositions of countries. Our benefit cost account of n at i o n state structure takes individual states or governments as monolithic decision units, and abstracts from al l s i ngularities stemming from geography and history. The model contains no elements of mass action or m o b p s y chology to explain political upheavals. The equilibria we seek to describe will be limited to equilibria ar i s i ng fr om pairwise competition or challenge among states; alliances or other forms of coalitions whether for defens i ve purposes of survival or acquisitive purposes of conquest will be only briefly considered later in this paper.
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I am aware of the limits, pitfalls, dead ends, and possible false leads of a static approach to such a g r an d problem. Costs, benefits, plans and decisions to attack, resist, submit etc. may be spread out over many y ears, subject to postponement, revision, modification, and reversal. Clever and successful strategies may h i n g e o n s u ch dynamic effects and exploit them. Rather than the discreet, zero-one model presented here, d eci s i o n s b y states may be smooth and optimal especially when risk/prospect can be smoothly varied.
Reasonable choice may be conditioned by asymmetric information, credibility, and past established reputation;
n o r are all choices always "reasonable." Despite these many caveats and shortcomings, the model developed h er e h as t he compensating advantage of simplicity. We cannot incorporate all these realistic effects with the m an y b r an ches leading off of each; equally we cannot plausibly argue for still further simplification beyond this model. With a noteworthy parsimony of assumptions we identify important sources of stability and instability in the distribution of property among states, and of equal import the sources of such outcomes.
Later, we will briefly recognize how the destructiveness of war itself may influence these calculations, 5 and how a country's ability to borrow to defend itself or to conquer others can influence these outcomes.
DEFENSE ALLOCATION REQUIRED TO PRESERVE INDEPENDENCE
To d efi n e the crucial concept of the required allocation to defense which a nation might need to secure i t s p roperty, wealth, boundaries, and sovereignty we focus first on only one victim-nation in a world of (p otentially) infinitely wealthy other nation-predators. The context is single period and comparative static.
Ther efore, consider an initial distribution of property between two nations. This distribution will persist if each nat i on's benefit-cost analysis of the gains from conquest and the costs of national survival sustain that d i s t r i b u t ion. We call such enduring distributions, "equilibria," noting that there may be many such enduring equilibria distributions. Equilibrium thus is assumed to depend on ! the initial total and distribution or wealth among nations.
! t h e co s t , technology, and resources available for conquest or defense, including ability t o b o rrow resources from others (although our treatment of borrowing will be quite limited).
! the survival needs of both conquered and dominant societies.
! the destructiveness of war, the resistance of subjugated societies to exploitation, and efficiency of rulers in extracting tribute from their colonies as measured by necessary allocations t o ongoing subjugation (although we take only a few steps toward including the destructiveness of war).
Ini t i al l y we ignore possibilities for international borrowing and explicit analysis of the destructiveness of war itself, to be introduced later in our graphical analysis. We will not concern ourselves explicitly with t he population per se of victim nor conqueror, instead only with aggregate wealth, consumption, survival needs, etc. of societies. This could easily imply a correlation between total world wealth and peace; and it could imply that distributions of s maller more numerous states coexist in equilibrium at greater levels of aggregate wealth. Including this feat u r e i n the analysis is entirely feasible but doing so now makes it too complicated too soon, and I save this effect for a later exercise.
This paper demonstrates how it can be rational for all in an international system to spend on arms today 7 more than the expenditure needed to settle today's disputes peacefully. This can happen if settlement by conquest/conflict rather than by negotiation today save a country a future, ongoing, repeated arms drain. The relationships modeled in this paper could be extended to multi-period decision with the consequent issues of intertemporal foresight, consistency, and optimization.
BENEFIT COST CALCULUS OF DEFENSE
Now to analyze equilibrium configurations of property aggregate and distribution we assume:
1 . C o n fr o n t ations whether actual wars or demonstrations which lead to capitulation occur in a single period.
2. No international borrowing to finance attack or defense expenses is allowed to begin with, and past saving or stockpiling to build up a stock of military weapons is ignored also. (We briefly explore t he effects of both these below). Therefore, one equilibrium condition is that during each period:
(As el ab o r at ed in footnote 9, We could incorporate past saving and present borrowing in the constraint as M#R-S+S +$ where $ stands for borrowing and S stands for past military stockpiles accumulated at t = 0.) 3 . F u ll information with no uncertainty; therefore it can be rational for a country to spend as much as its entire current resource surplus over survival needs on M, if this allows i t t o co nquer a rich enough country, or deters another from conquest. See also Garfinkel and Sk ap er d as (2000) . If, to settle disputes short of war, it is possible or necessary to leave some 7 of t he s urplus "on the table" either for attacker or defender, then M or M will be less than V A t hes e am ounts, as this effect reduces the maximum extraction from a conquered population as well as a the maximum possible effort (available from current resource flows) to be directed toward conquest.
The calculus of conquest and survival may be different when sequences of moves and commitments 8 are allowed for the players. If conquest or submission is a gigantic game of international "chicken," then the capacity credibly to offer another the choice between annihilation and submission may not be adequately represented by force duel or conflict success function (CSF). The place of CSF's in making symmetric commitments as in Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) may be a lot more complicated. But CSF's (as in our linear case) are still crucial to outcomes determined by "naively rational extortion," when a not only will power but also a demonstrated capability to conqueror (not requiring actual application of force) may be necessary to evoke capitulation. t hos e defenses in the present period, it will enjoy the benefit forever, a durability which is cap t u r ed i n t h e function B . However, A may find that the benefit of conquest is not worth A the cost.
7 . Moreover, with no current borrowing and no inherited stockpiles, we also assume i ni t i ally that the resources required by A to successfully conquer V must be available to A o u t o f i ts current surplus. Similarly, resources required by V to maintain independence must b e av ai l able from current surplus. (As we later recognize both of these stocks may be augmentable by previous stockpiling or by borrowing)
In equilibrium country V either will persist as an independent state or it will be absorbed by a conqueror.
(If abs or pt i on occurs, V may eventually become an integrated equal partner with its conqueror, but that is n o t our present concern). Once all conquests/absorptions have been effected, an equilibrium will exist in the en t i r e i n t er n ational system since no nation both is capable of and would benefit from conquest of another.
F o r example suppose that a once conquered a country offers little resistance to exploitation; that is as s u m e t h at t h e ongoing costs to the conqueror of maintaining colonialism are low. Suppose in addition that the conquering power is patient, and therefore discounts future benefits rather little. Then quite possibly because a v i ct i m country's defense is limited to its surplus over survival needs in any single year while the temptation it offers to conquerors is high, it may not be able to secure its property/independence. This conclusion however wi l l depend crucially on the technology of defense versus offense, measured as the rate at which offensive The value of M which raises the cost of conquest above its benefit to A is defined implicitly by:
So long as conquest is worth the cost and perfect international financial markets exist, an attacking 9 country may be able to make up its resource shortfall by borrowing today and repaying out of the conquered surplus (if the attacker) in the future. Similarly a defending country should be able to borrow the entire present value of its surplus over survival needs to defend itself against takeover and pay back loans from that surplus in the future. Total borrowings and past savings then would add to offense and defense capabilities. Adding these factors first alters the resources constraints. We incorporate past saving and present borrowing in the constraint as M #R -S +S +$ and $ # $ ( R -S ) where $ stands for borrowing which is limited by some present j j j j j j j j j j value function of future surpluses, $ ( R -S ) which can be used to repay debts, and S stands for past military stockpiles 
V
With perfect information in international markets, both attacker and defender could not simultaneously borrow these maxima, as the market might anticipate that only one of the loans would be repaid. This effect could be incorporated in the present value borrowing constraints $ ( R -S ). The value of M which raises the cost of conquest above A's resources is defined implicitly V by:
We denote this value of M as M ("NF" for "not feasible").
V V NF These two distinct ways in which one country can prevent being conquered by another have differential effect s on t he nature of equilibrium. Because we assume here that countries cannot borrow internationally t o finance defense outlays and have not stockpiled arms in the past, the amounts M and M cannot exceed V A t h e surplus over subsistence available in the respective home country. The rule proposed here for V's 9 equilibrium allocation to "defensive" or independence sustaining military effort is: 
V V V r ead up to B to obtain the cost which V must impose on A (this being the amount C *) to make conquest A A u n economic, i.e. worth less than it costs; a horizontal from that point will intersect curve C ; from this For more on the distinction between conquest with and without war, see Grossman and Mendoza (2001) .
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Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) tell us that hot war requires wither incomplete information or an intertemporal strategy, neither of which are present in this paper.
As pointed out to me by referees, others have presented diagrammatic approaches to the conflict-12 merger-independence question with some features in common to that given here. These include Powell (1993 Powell ( , 1999 and Blainey (1991) . No t e t h at t he diagram actually identifies the amount of M that V will spend to avoid capitulation V to A if capitulation can be avoided, and the C curve shows the amount A must spend to induce V to capitulate.
A On t his interpretation, anarchic property distribution results from a success or failure of a sort of "naively r at i o n al ex t o r t ion." Analysis of hot war in which resources are destroyed on both sides is left for a later exercise.
SOME ALTERNATIVE BENEFIT-COST CONFIGURATIONS
We n o w can analyze how these two conditions imply (for various B and C functions, resources R, an d r el at i v e effectiveness of attack versus defense functions, H, and ignoring the effects of R on C ) whether A A a configuration of nation-states is in equilibrium or subject to alteration by forced redistribution, or when a single state is the only outcome. The benefit of this system is that it can be very easily captured and understood wi t h a few simple diagrams. count r y A i s able to conquer country V and will gain from doing so, gain in that its benefits exceed the cost of conquest. Such points, therefore, would never be observed as equilibrium outcomes. The figure also shows horizontally shaded areas where country V can defeat country A's attack, and therefore country V is safe;
and lastly the figure shows diagonally shaded areas with resource combinations such that country A could
Ceteris paribus ignoring differential effects for example of borrowing or weapons stockpiling.
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Charles Anderton noticed this implication of the logic presented here, and pointed it out to me. (I will take up some such alternatives presently).
Al though the incentive structure underlying observed equilibrium configurations of sovereign states m ay b e as pictured, this need not imply that all the combinations pictured would actually ever be observed.
F or exam ple, depending on the sustainability of configurations in which wealth is coveted but cannot be conquered, some may be non-equilibrium and not observed; or some for configurations near the origin positive al l o cat ions to M , or to M can be unnecessary to sustain independence and, therefore, should not be observed.
A V
EQUILIBRIUM DISTRIBUTIONS OF PROPERTY
This structure can now be used to give a map to relate distribution of wealth or property and the implied s t ability of the international system. would not want to conquer country 2(1).
C
Ar eas $ and $ show bilateral resource allocations for which country 1(2) would be able to conquer 1 2 country 2(1) but would not want to because the effort-cost exceeds the benefit.
C Areas ( and ( show bilateral resource distributions where country 1(2) both can and would want 1 2 to conquer country 2(1).
Lastly areas * and * show resource distributions for which country 1(2) would like to but has insuffi-1 2 I put "attack" and "conquest" in quotes because actual hot war is not necessary here, distribution may 15 be resolved by confrontation alone, by bribery or buy-out, where in the endowed configurations, CSF's etc. may simply establish initial bargaining points. cient resources to capture country 2(1).
Thus areas " and " and as well as * and * represent distributions of wealth such that the potential attacker 1 2 1 2 has insufficient resources to effect a successful conquest ---or equivalently such that the victim does have s u ffi ci en t r es o u r ces to make "conquest" impossible. On the other hand, in the areas $ and $ a successful 1 2 " a t t ack " is possible; resources are such that the attacker can overwhelm the defender, but the cost of success 1 5 would outweigh the benefits.
It fo llows that all the combinations ---that is the intersections or overlaps of areas ---" " , " * , " * , 1 2 1 2 2 1 $ * , $ * , and * * , all represent stable distribution of property configurations. On the other hand, the 1 2 2 1 1 2 over l appi ng ar eas * ( , and ( * are unstable. In these last two areas country V cannot allocate sufficient 1 2 1 2 r es ources to its own defense to cause the value which it constitutes for potential conqueror, A, to fall short o f the resources required for a successful conquest ---i.e. V cannot make it irrational for A to attack. Nor fo r t h es e u n stable distributions of property or wealth ---that is for * ( , and ( * ---can V allocate so much means to conquer the other. Figure 3 ---tend to be stable if they are very unequal, fo r t h en although large rich countries can conquer small poor ones, the natural advantage of the defense makes this more costly than it is worth. These are regions of stability due to insufficient benefits from conquest or " Secu r i t y by Denial of Benefit." At the same time, roughly equal distributions of resources among states m ak e all invulnerable to conquest because none is physically/financially capable of conquering others even
Di s t r i butions of wealth ---according to
With more than two countries, this simple classification will be inadequate, since any one country may 16 fall into different categories when compared with several other countries. t hough i t woul d pay to do so if it were affordable. These are regions of stability due to insufficiency of r es o u r ces, "Security by Making Conquest Unaffordable." These conclusions may change, of course, if 16 t h e b en efi t and cost functions are no longer symmetric; and indeed, asymmetry should be the rule for reasons of geography, culture, technical evolution and style and so on, all calling for adjustments in the depiction or r ealization of the model. To infer at this stage, therefore, that historically raw equality is to be expected in the data would be unjustified.
EFFECTS OF PAST WEAPONS STOCKPILING, CURRENT BORROWING FROM ABROAD AND OF THE DESTRUCTIVENESS OF WAR.
We h av e t ak en a complex problem and boiled it down to its essentials, believing that the gains from s i m pl i fi cat i on are worth the insight gained. The diagrams show more than outcomes, or equilibrium values; t h ey give the entire field of incentives which the opportunity for gainful war may reflect. Moreover, as we now shall see they lend themselves very effectively to showing how such important extra features such as ability to stockpile weapons etc. change the incentives.
Stockpiled Weapons
C ons ider first the possibility that a country has stockpiled weapons in past time periods. With such co s t s sunk, the prospective costs of war are reduced. We can show that directly as in Figure 4 just by shifting d o wn ward the C curve. We might assume that the downward shift is a simple summation of past weapons for which country 1 (country 2) cannot and would not want to conquer country 2(1).
C
Ar eas $ and $ may increase or decrease in size. These show bilateral resource 1 2 allocations for which country 1(2) would be able to conquer country 2(1) but would not want to because the effort-cost exceeds the benefit. like to but has insufficient resources to capture country 2(1).
Borrowing for War
Next consider effects of an ability to borrow (assuming no stockpiling for simplicity). First borrowing, cet er i s paribus, reduces the cost out of present resources of overcoming any given sized enemy forces; thus the first effect of borrowing is to lower present cost; C shifts down and C shifts leftward. This is pictured 
C
Lastly areas * and * may decrease. These show resource distributions for which 1 2 country 1(2) would like to but has insufficient resources to capture country 2(1).
Opportunity Cost of War
It was pointed out in the context of Table I fo r wh i ch country 1(2) would like to but has insufficient resources to capture country 2(1). by areas * and ( may or may not represent peaceful equilibrium configurations, depending on the specifics of C and B curves, abilities to borrow, and to stockpile for wars, and specifics of surpluses available for theft or conquest. With this approach we can identify some unexpected interdependencies between resource d i s t r i butions, technologies, and conflict, as well as confirm previously held intuitions. For example this set-up wi l l i dent i fy cases in which a given distribution of income among countries tends to be unsustainable because o n e country is able to and would benefit from conquering another. Sometimes from such unstable distributions s t ability can be generated by transferring income "peacefully" among existing "competitor" states, without i n cr eas i n g t h e t otal (not an unexpected result). On the other hand cases in which the cost curves C J overlap A wo u l d indicate a state of distribution in which both countries would benefit from conquering the other and ar e capable of successful conquest. This could require striking asymmetry in the cost curves, or an pronounced co m p arative advantage for offensive forces, but it could indicate a "pocket of indeterminacy" (terminology s ugges t ed by Charles Anderton), where objective incentives to fight (or to capitulate) exist for both of two (or all) rivals. An unsuspected configuration such as this may be more likely be a prelude to negotiated merger.
Destructiveness of War
Again unexpectedly the analysis suggests that (given symmetry in cost and present value benefit functions an d l i n ear i t y as in our diagrams) for more or less equal distributions of wealth countries can put up defenses wh i ch an attacker cannot afford to defeat and capture. These are areas " " , " * , * " , and * * in Figure   1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 . Un d er s u ch "equal" distributions, if all countries are "poor", with resources (to the left or below the i n t ersections of C and B ) conquest would not be worth it even if possible so there it is the non desirable A A co n s t r ai n t which binds. But for higher aggregate of world wealth more or less equally distributed, (north and eas t of the intersections of C and B ) the unaffordability constraint is binding. The analysis also confirms A A and i llustrates ones intuition that an ability to borrow and/or to stockpile weapons narrows down the set of d i s t r i b u t i o n s of world aggregate wealth for which war cannot be afforded. This shows in the diagrams as c u r v es C and/or B shift downward and to the left narrowing down the areas " " , " * , * " , and * * . On e's ex p ect at i o n should be that if any capture or predation is worthwhile in the sense that it is worth more t h an its cost, then prospective conquerors should be able to find the resources on world markets to conduct t h ei r war s an d share (via debt repayments) their loot. In terms of Figure 3 borrowing and past weapons accum ul ation should reduce the relevance of areas * and * , and in particular overlap between them. (Of   1  2 cour s e abandoni ng an assumption of symmetry can produce a great range of variation such as where conquest favors one country at low income levels but the other country at higher levels.)
This setup also permits ready analysis of the effects of changes in war fighting technology ---for example ch an ges which favor offense or defense. Similarly the effects of changes in a society's benefit calculus including di s count r at e and costs of occupation are readily pictured as alterations in the position or shape of the benefit f u n ct i ons B J . Note that both shifts in the C-curves and B-curves re-position the crossover point between B
A an d C , and therefore the regions where security by non-affordability of conquest, versus non-desirability obtain.
On t h e o t h er hand, because the analysis is comparative static, it cannot do full justice to the intertemporal m ul t i -per i od nature of the phenomenon, nor to questions of dynamic consistency ---disadvantages to be set off against the economy of expression of this approach.
Moreover the analysis is suggestive as to how economic growth ---which moves the wealth distribution p o i n t in Figure 3 outward ---may alter the incentives for merger, or precede resource alignments conducive t o fr ag mentation. Similarly, Figure 3 suggests that when extended to groups of three or more countries, a m er g er or division between two may change radically the incentives relating to a third. Evidently, introducing t he pos s i bility that benefit and cost curves ---B J J
, and CA ---can be convex or concave may produce numerous A ot her r egions of stability or instability. Other extensions of the analysis should include better integration of b o r r o wing, inclusion of population (in addition to wealth) as an independent variable in the benefit and cost functions, and a focus on the effects of conquest upon productivity of the conquered country. The Effects of Borrowing for War on System Wide Safety/Vulnerability
